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reaction among teacher organizations. As we shall see, although that reaction has been anything but
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IV. EDUCATION REFORM AND 
TEACHER BARGAINING 
The Education Reform Movement 
and the Realities of Collective 
Bargaining 
ROBERT E. DOHERTY AND DAVID B. LIPSKY 
Cornell University 
The Crisis in Education 
Americans are worrying about how well our children are being 
educated. One source of that worry is that we have over the past 
several years been losing our competitive edge, and that loss, many 
believe, is connected to the declining educational achievement of 
American workers, as measured by SAT scores and other indices of 
student achievement. "We hear so much about positioning America to 
compete," Education Secretary Lauro Cavazos said recently. "How 
can we achieve what we want to achieve if our citizens are not 
educated to their highest potential?" (Tolchin, 1982). 
Still another source of worry is the troubling fact that over 20 
million American adults, most of whom are products of our public 
school system, are functionally illiterate. Beyond what this grim 
statistic may imply in respect to economic growth is the fear that our 
system of democratic government is imperiled by a badly educated 
and ill-informed citizenry. 
The response to what many believe to be a serious decline in 
educational achievement and standards has been, so far, a spate of 
studies, commissions, and reports, all aiming toward reform of the 
education system. Most of the recommendations that have been 
Authors' address: New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell 
University, Ives Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853. 
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implemented to date have come about through state-level legislation 
and mandates (Darling-Hammond and Berry, 1988). Education 
reformers disagree on the role of teacher bargaining in achieving their 
objectives. One wing of the reform movement believes collective 
bargaining is an obstacle to change and maintains collective 
bargaining is one reason the schools are in bad shape. But another wing 
holds that collective bargaining can and must be used as the vehicle of 
change in our schools. 
Although the recommendations contained in these reports are wide-
ranging, covering everything from school finance to curriculum to edu-
cational technology, in this paper our emphasis will be on proposals 
dealing with such matters as how teachers are to be recruited, retained, 
compensated, and deployed. And just as the so-called reform movement 
is a reaction to the process of education, the reform movement has 
engendered a reaction among teacher organizations. As we shall see, 
although that reaction has been anything but wholeheartedly accepting, 
neither has it been uniformly hostile. 
What can be learned from the identifiable characteristics of public 
school teachers, and how might those characteristics contribute to the 
current difficulty? First, to the extent SAT scores are a reasonably 
good indication of teacher quality, one cannot be reassured. 
According to the Carnegie study, A Nation Prepared: Teachers for the 
21st Century, the combined average SAT score of high school seniors 
planning to become teachers in 1985 was about 60 points lower than 
that of all college-bound students (Carnegie Forum on Education and 
the Economy, 1986). Moreover, the most talented teachers, at least as 
measured by the National Teachers Examination, tend to leave the 
profession much sooner than those demonstrating the least talent.1 
Attrition has always been a problem in the teaching profession, 
whether among the most or the least talented. For example, for 
elementary teachers in the age cohort 22-30 the attrition rate is 21 
percent, substantially higher than the 13 percent rate for grade school 
teachers age 61-65. Junior and senior high school teachers average 
about 12 percent for the 22-30 age range. It is particularly troubling, 
given the importance of at least a modicum of scientific training for 
new entrants into the workforce, that 11.5 percent of math and science 
teachers leave teaching before reaching the age of 30 (Grissmer and 
Kirby, 1987). 
1
 A North Carolina study showed that 62.5 percent of those scoring in the top 10 
percent on the NTE left teaching within seven years whereas only 37.3 percent of those 
scoring in the bottom 10 percent left during that period (Schlechty and Vance, 1981). 
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It is no less troubling to hear that less than two-thirds of college 
graduates qualified to teach math and science actually go into teaching 
(Rumberger, 1984). And that could be because college graduates 
trained in those disciplines can, in New York State at least, command 
salaries upward of $5,000 more in industry than they would get if they 
went into teaching (State Education Department, 1987). 
Surely it is difficult to build a profession out of an occupation char-
acterized by such a high turnover rate, particularly when turnover is the 
highest during the early years of employment. Indeed, it is probable that 
many teachers don't stick round long enough to master their craft. 
There may have been a slight decline in attrition in recent years. (In 
New York State, for example, attrition fell from 12.8 percent in 1974 to 
9.2 in 1984 [Grossmer and Kirby, 1987]). And there has been a small 
increase in the number of college freshmen indicating an interest in 
teaching. The figure was 8 percent in 1987, compared to 5 percent in 
1983. But the 1987 figure must be compared to the figures of the late 
1960s when the proportion was almost 25 percent (Education Week, 
1988). We might also possibly draw some comfort from the fact that a 
growing number of men and women are leaving other occupations to 
train to become teachers. But the information on this new source of 
recruits is, at best, anecdotal (Berger, 1988); it would take a movement 
of extraordinary proportions to bring the teaching force up to the level 
needed. The authors of A Nation Prepared estimate that we will need 
1.3 million new teachers between the present and 1992. That report 
also suggests that if we were to rely on newly minted college graduates 
alone to man the classrooms, 25 percent would have to go into 
teaching (Carnegie Forum on Education and the Economy, 1986). 
Equally troubling are the statistics contained in a recent report pre-
pared by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. According to the 
Metropolitan survey, 34 percent of public school teachers with less than 
five years experience say that they are likely to leave the profession 
within five years. Nor are the figures for those with five to nine years 
experience—30 percent—more encouraging (Daniels, 1988). 
What all these figures seem to demonstrate is that we have an 
unstable, or potentially unstable, and not entirely happy teacher 
workforce. Nor does the quality of those remaining appear to be quite 
the calibre students and parents have a right to expect.2 
2
 Levin (1988) has pointed out the strong correlation between teacher verbal ability 
and student achievement. 
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The Reform Movement 
It would not be possible in this short space to summarize the 
several reports that come under the general rubric of educational 
reform. The single thread running through them is that we are in 
trouble and something dramatic needs to be done. The two reports 
that have received the widest attention are A Nation at Risk, essentially 
a product of the Reagan administration, and A Nation Prepared, the 
product of the Carnegie Forum on Education and the Economy. If it 
is possible to so characterize, A Nation at Risk is the more conservative 
of the two documents; the emphasis is on lengthening the school day 
and year, more use of standardized tests, beefing up student 
discipline, etc. Little attention was paid to involving teachers in school 
policy decisions on a systematic basis. As for teacher compensation, 
the report advocated abandoning the traditional teacher salary 
schedule in favor of a system of merit or performance-based pay, as 
well as the development of career ladders and master teacher plans. 
The Carnegie study, on the other hand, is more far-reaching and, 
we believe, has a greater likelihood of success. Although it contains 
many recommendations similar to those contained in A Nation at Risk, 
the Carnegie report differs in that it would provide a greater role for 
teachers and their organizations, and is less sanguine about merit 
schemes. Rather, A Nation Prepared recommends that "salary 
increments must be associated with different levels of responsibility" 
(Carnegie Forum on Education and the Economy, 1986). The report 
sees four categories of teachers (licensed, certified, advanced, and 
lead teacher) differentiated only by experience, functions, and 
competence. The experiment currently under way in the Rochester, 
New York, public schools is based in part on these recommendations. 
We shall have more to say about the Rochester experiment later. 
The Realities of Collective Bargaining 
As we pointed out earlier, teacher unions have not embraced these 
recommendations with open arms. Former Secretary Bennett com-
plained: "In recent years, the Nation's largest teacher union—the Nation-
al Education Association—has shown itself to be the most entrenched 
and aggressive opponent of education reform" (Bennett, 1987). 
That observation could be but another example of the former 
Secretary's penchant for hyperbole, but NEA President Mary Futrell's 
comments on the Carnegie recommendations suggest that Bennett's 
criticism did not miss the mark entirely. "I have deep reservations 
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about some of the report's conclusions and recommendations," she 
wrote. The proposal to provide different pay scales for different levels 
of responsibility, she thought, "suggests that some teachers are more 
equal than others. And it is not adequately differentiated from the 
flawed and failed merit pay and job ladder plans" (Carnegie Forum 
on Education and the Economy, 1986). 
American Federation of Teachers (AFT) President Albert 
Shanker's comments were far more friendly. Although he would have 
liked to have had more of his "ideas and differences withstand the 
Task Force process," Shanker concluded, "This report deserves full 
support. It promises to turn teaching into a full profession, make major 
structural changes in schools and take giant steps in the improvement 
of learning" (Carnegie Forum on Education and the Economy, 1986). 
In a sense, the different response by the two union leaders is not 
surprising. The AFT's strength tends to be in the larger cities, and that 
seems to be where the greatest problems are, in discipline, 
achievement, dropout rate, and in just about any other measure one 
can think of. Many participants in the urban school districts—teachers, 
administrators, board members, and union leaders alike—believe the 
situation has become so desperate they are willing to try just about 
anything no matter how initially unsettling a significant change might 
be. 
We do not mean to suggest that merely because a few AFT locals 
have begun to implement some of the reform proposals that the 
movement is well under way. Indeed, we see a great deal of hesitancy 
on the part of teachers, unions, and administrators. The reasons for this 
"foot-dragging" are understandable. First, the prevalent system of 
compensation that rewards teachers solely on the basis of experience 
and graduate training is an arrangement both teachers and 
administrators find comfortable. It makes no invidious comparisons 
among teachers, and it is simple to administer. Second, distinctions as 
to individual worth or competence are not all that easy to make. Nor 
do we know for certain that monetary incentives based on teacher 
performance reap the desired results. Does the possibility of grabbing 
the cash carrot cause teachers with lackluster records to improve their 
performance? Evidence on the effect such incentives have on 
performance in the nonteacher area is mixed at best. Third, earlier 
attempts to break out from the so-called lock-step system of 
compensation have not been successful. And most failed even in the 
absence of any collective resistance from organized teachers 
(Bacharach, Lipsky, and Shedd, 1984). 
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Still, we are in trouble. We don't recruit the most able of our own 
college graduates into teaching. We don't even get them from the top 
half. The attrition rate is far too high, and those most likely to leave 
early are among the most gifted. The most widespread system of 
compensation which treats all teachers as fungible is insensitive to 
market forces. We pointed out earlier the problems schools have 
recruiting and retaining math and science teachers. 
We can take some encouragement, however, from the experiments 
now being conducted in several large districts. They provide evidence 
that at least some union leaders and administrators recognize the 
severity of the problem and are willing to risk new approaches. The 
Rochester experiment is a case in point. 
Rochester is a large city school district that suffers from almost all 
of the ills of other urban districts. In August 1987 the Rochester City 
School District and the Rochester Teachers Association signed a three-
year collective bargaining agreement that incorporates many of the 
recommendations contained in the Carnegie report, as well as other 
reports. First, the agreement will increase teacher salaries by over 40 
percent by 1990. But teachers will be required to work 190, rather than 
185, days a year and will relinquish some of their seniority rights. The 
pact also abolishes the traditional salary schedule, establishing instead 
four categories teachers can move through: interns, that is, first-year 
teachers without prior experience; residents, who have been interns 
but do not yet have permanent certification; professionals, or fully 
licensed teachers; and lead teachers, a position obtained through 
competition and reserved for teachers who have at least 10 years of 
experience and meet high standards of performance.3 
Lead teachers can eventually earn up to $70,000 a year. But they 
will work more hours and days and will waive seniority rights in 
assignments and transfers. Lead teachers will also spend at least half 
their time serving as mentors to other teachers. 
The Rochester agreement assigns all teachers responsibility for 
personally overseeing a group of students, directs teachers to make 
home visits, and provides for other forms of student counseling. It also 
incorporates a pilot project called the Peer Assistance and Review 
(PAR) program that substantially revamps the traditional teacher 
evaluation system. PAR places primary responsibility for the 
Rochester Teachers Association and Rochester City School District, Agreement, 
August 1987; Rochester Teachers Association and Rochester City School District, 
"Career in Teaching Plan: Joint Statement on Interns," May 1988. See also "Big Raises 
. . .," (1987). 
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evaluation of new teachers (or interns) in the hands of experienced 
teachers (or mentors). The Rochester agreement also establishes a 
school-based planning process that shifts major decision-making 
responsibilities from the district level to building-level "teams" of 
teachers and administration representatives.4 
It is, of course, too early to assess the effects of this major 
experiment in reform on the quality of education provided in 
Rochester's schools. Indeed, one of the dangers Rochester faces is 
pressure to produce quick and demonstrable results. For our purposes, 
the lesson of the Rochester experiment is that collective bargaining is 
not necessarily the obstacle to reform that some critics claim it is. 
Instead, given the fact that 75 percent of the teacher workforce is 
organized, we think it likely that genuine reform can only be achieved 
through collective bargaining. 
The willingness on the part of the Rochester teachers to participate 
in a scheme that departs so significantly from previous arrangements 
suggests that when a teacher union has reached maturity, experimen-
tation is possible. When teacher unions are no longer threatened by 
school boards, legislatures, or by mass defection, we believe they will 
begin to be more accepting of compensation schemes that recognize 
differences in talent and responsibility. 
The advantage of such schemes as we see in Rochester and 
elsewhere is not only that there is a real difference between the salary 
of a rank-and-file teacher and a "lead" teacher (as against the token 
difference characteristic of most merit plans), but more importantly, 
the differential is based as much on assuming additional responsibili-
ties as it is on classroom performance. That alone should make this 
arrangement more palatable to teachers who have long been skeptical 
of plans grounded on performance-based distinctions. We also believe 
it possible that by establishing a hierarchy, competent and dedicated 
teachers may become even more competent and dedicated as they vie 
for the more responsible—and more highly paid—positions. As we 
pointed out earlier, we are not so sanguine about the effect this 
opportunity would have on the lackluster. Another possible result of 
Rochester-like experiments—and this could be the most important— 
would be a decline in the exodus of the most talented teachers from 
our public schools. Under the Rochester plan, for example, at least a 
few teachers can earn annual salaries of as much as $70,000. We doubt 
4
 See note 3. See also Rochester City School District, Peer Assistance and Review 
Program: 1986-87 Local Evaluation Report, January 1988, and Gillett and Halkett 
(1988). 
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that many teachers so amply rewarded would look so longingly for 
employment in industry. It is not necessary for every teacher in a 
school to be excellent, but it is important that there be a few to set the 
tone and provide the proper example, thus encouraging others to 
perform just a little better. The Rochester plan seems to us to make 
that possible. 
It will take some time (probably several years) before we know 
whether these experiments are successful, i.e., will there be greater 
student achievement under these more flexible systems than there has 
been (and is) under more rigid compensation arrangements? 
Improving student achievement, after all, is the primary goal; 
changing the way in which we deploy and compensate teachers is 
merely a means toward that end. There is a risk, however, that a public 
that often seeks instant panaceas will lack the patience to wait several 
years for a program to produce meaningful results. 
We are, however, optimistic. The source of that optimism is the 
way in which some local teacher unions, with some encouragement at 
national levels, have embraced the reform movement. Several 
cherished union beliefs and practices that seem to frustrate reform 
proposals are giving way to more professional concerns. We believe 
that to be an important first step. 
